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NOTES
CURFEW LAWS, FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, AND THE RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, the arrest rate for minors between the ages of
ten and seventeen in the District of Columbia was the highest in the
nation.' Teens from the age of fifteen to nineteen met violent deaths
in Washington D.C. more frequently than in any other city in the na-
tion.2 Moreover, the problem was escalating. Between 1987 and 1995,
the juvenile arrest rate "for aggravated assault increased by 89.8%,
for murder by 157%, and for carrying a dangerous weapon by
282.7%."'
Concerned with these frightening statistics, the D.C. Council
adopted a juvenile curfew ordinance.4 Washington, D.C. was not the
first city to do so. President Clinton advocated curfew laws as a
measure to keep children safe,5 and during the 1990s many cities have
turned to curfew laws6 in an effort to stem rising rates in juvenile
crime.7
Litigation ensued, and the District of Columbia's curfew law be-
gan its journey through the federal judicial system. In Hutchins v.
1 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
("Mhe juvenile violent crime arrest rate for juveniles ages 10 to 17 was higher than that in any
state and was more than three times the national average.") (citation omitted).
2 See id.
3 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd on reh'g en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
4 See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
5 See THE WHrrE HouSE, MAKING OUR SCHOOLS AND COMMUN1TIES SAFER (March 19,
1998) ("Because of the success of curfews in helping to fight juvenile crime and keeping chil-
dren safe, the Clinton Administration has encouraged communities to adopt curfew policies.").
6 See Mark Potok, Teen curfews 'the norm' in more cities, USA TODAY, June 26, 1995,
at IA (stating that since 1990 "53 cities have enacted a curfew ordinance; another 37 revised
older laws").
7 See i at 1A ("The most common age for arrestees nationally is now 16, and an up-
coming Department of Justice analysis reports that juveniles were behind 30% of the growth in
violent crime between 1988 and 1992."); Patty Ryan, Lights on, teens home, THE TAiPA TRIB.,
July 16, 1995, at 1 ("Nationwide, arrests for juvenile violent crime shot up 67 percent in the
nine years after 1984.").
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District of Columbia,8 the district court found the curfew unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it impermissibly burdened minors' right to
freedom of movement and interfered with a parent's right to control
the activities of their children.9 On appeal, a three-judge panel af-
firmed without agreeing on a rationale.' 0 The D.C. Circuit agreed to
rehear the case en banc and reversed, again unable to agree upon a
rationale."
This Note focuses on the central constitutional question posed by
juvenile curfew laws and confronted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals: whether a curfew violates a minor's12 right to travel on public
fora.13 The question of whether a curfew law violates a minor's right
to travel on public fora encompasses two issues: (1) whether a right to
8 942 F. Supp. 665, 680 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
9 See id. at 680.
10 Judge Rogers, writing for the court, argued that minors possess fundamental rights, but
legislation burdening these rights should be subject to an intermediate standard of review. See
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd on reh'g en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Judge Tatel, on the other hand, argued that legislation
burdening the rights of minors should be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review. See id. at
826 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge Silberman, in contrast, argued that minors have no fundamen-
tal right "to be unaccompanied on the streets at night." Id. at 828 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
e The plurality opinion in Hutchins held that: (1) juveniles do not have a fundamental
right to be on the streets at night without adult supervision; (2) parents do not have a right to
"unilaterally determine" if their children will roam the streets at night; and (3) even assuming
that the curfew implicates the fundamental rights of both minors and adults, the curfew satisfies
intermediate scrutiny. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538-48. Judge Edwards, concurring in part and
concurring in result, found that the curfew law implicates the fundamental right of parents to
control the "'care,' 'nurture,' 'upbringing,' 'management,' and 'rearing' of their child, id. at
560, but the law survives intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 548-52. In contrast, Judges NVald and
Garland, concurring in part and concurring in result, found that although the curfew law impli-
cates the fundamental rights of both minors and parents, but in both instances survives interme-
diate scrutiny. See id. at 552. Judge Rogers, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found that
the curfew law implicates a minor's fundamental right "to walk through public streets without
thereby subjecting oneself to police custody," id at 562, that intermediate scrutiny is the appro-
priate standard of review, and that the curfew law is unconstitutional under an intermediate
scrutiny standard. See id at 563-70. Judge Tatel, dissenting, found that the curfew law burdens
the fundamental rights of both minors and parents, that in each case legislation that burdens
those rights should be subject to strict scrutiny, and that the curfew law cannot survive strict
scrutiny because of the burdens it places on parental rights. See id. at 562-70.
12 Throughout the course of this Note, I will use the terms "juveniles," "minor," and
"child" interchangeably to refer to those unemancipated persons who are under the age of 17.
13 Many other constitutional challenges have been made against curfew laws, but they are
beyond the scope of this Note. Among these challenges are: vagueness, freedom of movement,
freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and the Equal Protection
Clause. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
aft'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a curfew ordinance did not infringe on free-
dom of speech). These laws have also been challenged under the Fourth Amendment, and for
violating a parent's right to freedom from undue government interference upon child rearing.
See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 538 (W.D. Va. 1997) (applying
a rational basis test to uphold a curfew law against an undue influence claim because age is not
a suspect class).
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free movement exists; and (2) if such a right exists, does it protect
juveniles to the same extent that it protects adults.
Part I of this Note considers whether a right to travel on public
fora may be established by analogy to Supreme Court case law on the
right to interstate travel. Part II sketches the struggle of the Supreme
Court to find a standard of review for alleged burdens of juvenile
rights. Part Im analyzes the circuit split on the issue of intrastate travel
and concludes that a right to travel on public fora exists as an aspect
of substantive due process. Part Ill also concludes that courts con-
fronting this issue should use an "undue burden" standard as a thresh-
old inquiry when deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny to
alleged violations of this right. Part IV analyzes the three standards of
review (strict scrutiny, intermediate review, and rational basis) that
have been used by courts in dealing with juvenile rights and con-
cludes that alleged infringements of rights held by juveniles that
would be fundamental if held by adults merit intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, Part V of this Note applies the "undue burden" test and the
intermediate scrutiny standard of review to the District of Columbia
curfew ordinance, and concludes that it is constitutional.
I. THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL
"Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer ..... ,14
Courts frequently rely on interstate travel case law to support the
proposition that a fundamental right to intrastate travel exists. 15 Little
in the way of argument, however, is offered to support this conclu-
sion. Stating that "language in the decisions suggests that the right
extends to purely local movement' 16 does not help the cause. A
meaningful argument supporting this statement must identify both the
source of such a right and the rationale underlying its existence.
17
14 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
15 See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 542-43 (W.D. Va.
1997), aft'd, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) (relying in part on interstate travel case law); Bykof-
sky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254-55 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd men., 535
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing, inter alia, right to interstate travel cases).
16 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 561 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Thus, Judge Rogers is wrong when he argues in dissent that "there is no reason for this
court to resolve the debate" about the source of the right to travel. Id. at 562 n.22. This would be
true if the court was merely applying Supreme Court precedent, which it is not. Instead, Judge
Rogers' opinion attempts to analogize interstate travel case law to an intrastate travel case.
Claiming that the right to travel encompasses both rights, see id. at 560-62, the opinion makes a
sweeping generalization that interstate and intrastate travel are the same without offering a
reason why this is so-the logical fallacy of dicto simpliciter. Nor does the assertion that intra-
state mobility is "important" because of "its utility and the implications of its denial," id. at 561,
aid the argument. Despite its emotive appeal, this statement is irrelevant to the argument that a
right of intrastate mobility is implied by the Supreme Court's interstate travel case law.
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One of the problems with relying on interstate travel cases is the
inability of the Court to agree upon a constitutional source for this
right. Not surprisingly, the source of such a right (as well as its scope
as developed in these cases) has clear implications for the viability of
a right to travel on public fora by analogy. This Part reviews the vari-
ous constitutional theories the Court has offered to support its inter-
state travel case law. It also assesses the prospects of each of these
theories to serve as a springboard for an analogous right to travel on
public fora.
The pedigree of the right to interstate travel is long and varied.
The right to interstate travel first appeared in 1825 as an aspect of the
privileges enjoyed by citizens of the United States under the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.1 8 Since this first mention, the
right to travel has been variously described as residing within the am-
bit of the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and as a right inferred from the structure of our
Constitution. 19 In more recent years, this right has also been found to
reside in the Due Process Clause. 20 However, on the whole, the Court
has agreed to disagree on the specific source of this right.2 '
A. Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
Case law grounding the right to travel in the Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause is rooted in 19th century case law.22 In
Corfield v. Coryell,23 Justice Washington, while riding circuit, inti-
's See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (stating that the right of
a citizen to pass through another state was protected by the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
19 See Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986); Lutz v.
City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 262-65 (3d Cir. 1990).
20 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ("The right to travel is a part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment.").
21 See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902 ("[I]n light of the unquestioned historic acceptance of
the principle of free interstate migration... we have not felt impelled to locate this right defini-
tively in any particular constitutional provision.") (citation omitted).
22 See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). But see Saenz v.
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999). Saenz separates the "right to travel" into three components: (1) the
right of a citizen to enter into another state; (2) the right of that citizen to be treated as a "wel-
come visitor" while in another state; and (3) if the citizen chooses to become a permanent resi-
dent of the state which they are visiting, the right to be treated like all other citizens of that state.
See id. at 1525. The court did not identify the source of the first component of the right to travel.
See id. The court held that the second component is "expressly protected" by the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, while the third is governed by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1526.
23 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). The Corfield court held that a New Jersey statute,
which prohibited non-residents from gathering shellfish within New Jersey's waters in a ship
that was owned by a non-resident, was constitutional. See id. at 551-53.
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mated that this clause was a source of fundamental rights.24 Justice
Washington broadly described these rights as those necessary for "the
enjoyment of life and liberty," 5 and included "[t]he right of a citizen
of one state to pass through ... any other state.
' 26
This conception of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause lasted for less than fifty years. In Paul v. Virginia,27 the Court
held that a corporate tax imposed by Virginia on foreign insurance
companies was constitutional.28 The Paul Court rejected the Corfield
view that the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was a
source of implied fundamental rights in dicta.29 The effect of the Paul
dicta was to redefine the right to interstate travel as an anti-
discrimination right embodied in principles of federalism.30
The Court embraced the Paul dicta in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic.3 t Citing Paul, the Court observed that the
right to interstate travel is protected against two types of obstacles: (1)
"'the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement;,, 32 and (2)
"'being treated differently' from intrastate travelers. '33 This formula-
tion of the right to interstate travel is fully consistent with the anti-
discrimination principle set forth in Paul.
24 See id. at 551. ("We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of
all free governments .....
25 id.
2 Id. at 552. In total, Corfleld's definition of fundamental rights includes "everything but
the kitchen sink." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRuST 198 n.64 (1980).
2 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
28 See id. at 177.
29 See id. at 180 ("[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the
several States ... are those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the
latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens."). In Paul, a man
serving as an agent for an unlicensed corporation was indicted for violating a statute that for-
bade anyone from acting as an agent without a license. See id. at 169. A tax had to be paid in
order to obtain a license. See id. The agent argued that the act violated the Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause. See id. at 170-72. The Court held that the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply because the corporation was not a
citizen within the meaning of that clause. See id. at 177. Therefore, any discussion of the sub-
stantive scope of the rights conferred by that clause was pure dictum.
30 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities clause as "a federalism-based antidiscrimination principle").
3' 506 U.S. 263 (1993). Abortion clinics and organizations supporting those clinics sued
to enjoin Operation Rescue from demonstrating in a manner that obstructed general access to
those clinics. See id. at 266. The District Court granted injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(3) (1992), whose ancestor was § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See id. The precise issue
before the Court was whether a federal cause of action had been stated by the alleged private
conspiracy conducted by Operation Rescue to deprive individuals of their right to interstate
travel and their right to an abortion. See id. at 268,274,277.
32 Id. at 277 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982) and citing Paul, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180).
33 Id. (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6 and citing Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180).
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There are two difficulties with applying by analogy the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to the right to travel on public
fora. First, language of the clause itself will not support a right to
travel on public fora. The text of Article IV, Section Two of the Con-
stitution states that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 34 As Pro-
fessor Ely notes, "[tihis [is] an equality provision, intended to keep
states from treating outsiders worse than their own citizens. 35 The
clause does not speak to the duties owed by states to their own citi-
zens. Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause cannot be the
source of any right to intrastate travel.
The second problem with trying to locate a right to travel on
public fora under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is that the
clause would have no security. As Paul made clear, this clause is
violated only where a state denies to visitors the privileges that it be-
stows upon its own citizens.36 If all citizens are treated equally, then
the clause is not violated. Thus, a state could withhold the right to
travel from both its own citizens and out-of-state visitors and still
comply with Paul.
B. The Commerce Clause
The view that the right to travel is an aspect of the Commerce
Clause originates in Edwards v. California.37 Edwards involved a
California penal statute that forbade a resident from knowingly aiding
a nonresident in entering the state.38 The Court relied on the Com-
merce Clause to strike down the statute, stating that "it is settled be-
yond question that the transportation of persons is 'commerce,' within
the meaning of [the Commerce Clause]."39 Thus, the question was
whether a protectionist measure, designed to keep indigent non-
residents out of the state, violated the negative aspect of the Com-
34 U.S. CoNsr. arL IV, § 2.
3 ELY, supra note 26, at 23.
36 See Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 176-77.
37 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
38 See id. at 165-66.
39 Id. at 172 (citations omitted).
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merce Clause.4° Viewed from this perspective, the Court concluded
without much difficulty that the statute was unconstitutional.41
Any attempt to apply the Commerce Clause right to interstate
travel rationale by analogy to an asserted right to travel on public fora
must fail. The "negative," or "dormant," Commerce Clause prevents a
state from enacting protective legislation 42 There are several prob-
lems, however, with analyzing intrastate travel restrictions such as
curfew laws under such a doctrine. First, as the Court recognized in
Bray, if the right to interstate travel is derived from the negative
Commerce Clause, then "it could be eliminated by Congress.' 4 3 Sec-
ond, a curfew law applies generally to both in-state and out-of-state
residents. 4 Therefore, there is no protectionist motive on the part of
the state or municipality in enacting a curfew law.
Third, applying the dormant Commerce Clause to right to travel
on public fora cases would skew the analysis of the courts by focus-
ing on the wrong questions. People who oppose curfew laws do so
because they don't like their travel restricted, not because Joe Okla-
homa is upset that Tom Nebraska's business is benefiting from the
regulation. Thus, application of the dormant Commerce Clause would
skew the terms of the debate.
C. National Citizenship
In a concurring opinion in Edwards v. California,45 Justice
Douglas described the right to interstate travel as "an incident of na-
tional citizenship.' 4 6 The Court has occasionally grounded the right to
travel in a concept of national citizenship not tied to any specific con-
stitutional provision. The first member of the Court to do so was
40 As the Edwards Court stated, "[t]he issue presented in this case, therefore, is whether
the prohibition embodied in [the statute] against the 'bringing' or transportation of indigent per-
sons into California is within the police power of that State. We think that it is not, and hold that
it is an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce." Id. at 173; see also Lutz v. City of
York, 899 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Edwards... involved a statute prohibiting the im-
portation of 'goods' perceived to produce unwanted local burdens .... [Tihis is virtually per se
unconstitutional.").
41 See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174 ('We think this statute must fail under any known test of
the validity of State interference with interstate commerce.").
42 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that the cru-
cial issue under the dormant Commerce Clause is whether a law "is basically a protectionist
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns").
43 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 n.7 (1993).
4 In fact, many current curfew laws provide an exception for interstate travel. See, e.g.,
DALLAs, TEX., REV. ORDINANcIs ch. 31, § 31-33(c)(1)(C) (1992); see also infra note 278
(setting out the terms of the District of Columbia curfew ordinance).
45 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
46 L at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Douglas believed that
the right to interstate travel was firmly established as a right of national citizenship prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 179.
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Chief Justice Taney in his dissenting opinion in the Passenger
Cases.47 Chief Justice Taney stated that "[w]e are all citizens of the
United States; and, as members of the same community, must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of if without interrup-
tion, as freely as in our own States. ' 48
Chief Justice Taney's statement is a conclusion, not a constitu-
tional argument. The Chief Justice did not make reference to anything
in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution that suggests that a
right to interstate travel exists. The Court bolstered Chief Justice Ta-
ney's statement in Shapiro v. Thompson.49 Shapiro explained that the
right to interstate travel results from the unity of "the nature of our
Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty.,
50
This unity is not present when the issue is whether there is a right to
travel on public fora.
The right to interstate travel recognized in Shapiro exists, in part,
to prevent one state from excluding (or expelling) citizens of other
states. Language in later decisions confirms that this was the purpose
of the right to travel recognized in Shapiro. In fact, the right recog-
nized by Shapiro is now described "more precisely, [as] the right of
free interstate migration." 51 The "nature of our Federal Union" re-
quires that citizens of the United States, as citizens of the United
States, be free to relocate from one state to another if they so choose.
The right to travel on public fora does not implicate the "nature
of our Federal Union." Intrastate travel restrictions do not prevent
citizens from changing residences or implicate any other federalism-
related concerns. By definition, these travel restrictions apply solely
to travel within the state that enacted the legislation. Thus, there is no
"unity" of interests between the "nature of our Federal Union" and
constitutional concepts of individual liberty in an interstate travel
case. Therefore, the right to interstate travel recognized by concepts
of "national citizenship" provides a poor analogy for a right to travel
on public fora.
D. Substantive Due Process
Kent v. Dulles52 described the right to travel as "a part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process
47 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
48 Id. at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
49 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
50 Id. at 629.
51 Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986).
52 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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of law under the Fifth Amendment." 53 In Kent, citizens sued the Sec-
retary of State after he refused to issue them passports.54 Hence, the
right to travel involved in Kent was the right to travel internationally.
The Court held that the Secretary of State's action in denying pass-
ports on the basis of association was beyond the authority vested in
the Secretary by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952.55 Thus, Kent avoided the "important constitutional ques-
tion[]" that would arise if Congress had authorized a restriction of
"the citizens' right of free movement."
56
Much of the discussion in Kent surrounding the right to travel
concerned the social utility of visiting foreign nations.57 Kent also
cited the writings of scholar Zachariah Chafee extensively to refer-
ence both the right to migrate from one state to another and the right
to travel abroad.58 The citations, and other language in the opinion,
suggest that the Court was analogizing the right to travel internation-
ally to the right to travel interstate.59
The discussion of the right to travel offered in Kent, however,
was dictum because the Court avoided the constitutional question by
a narrow interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. The Court returned to the Kent dicta in Haig v. Agee60 and set-
tled on a curious interpretation. Agee concerned an action brought by
an ex-CIA agent challenging the revocation of his passport by the
Secretary of State.61 Agee argued that the act of revoking his passport
impermissibly burdened his right to travel freely abroad. 62 The Court
disagreed, stating that "the freedom to travel outside the United States
must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United
States. 63
5' Id. at 125.
"4 The Secretary of State refused to issue the passports because the plaintiffs would not
file an affidavit concerning their alleged Communist party membership. See id. at 119-20.
S See id. at 130.
6 id.
57 See ki. at 126. The Court emphasized that this right emerged in Anglo-Saxon law at the
time of the Magna Charta. See id. (citing ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CoNsTrtJTIoN OF 1787 (lst ed. 1936)).
53 See hi. (citing CHAFEE, supra note 57, at 171-81, 197).
59 See id. The Court stated that "[flreedom of movement across frontiers in either direc-
tion, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the
country, may be necessary for a livelihood." Id. Read in context, these sentences compare the
right to interstate travel with the right to travel abroad.
0 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
61 See id. at 283-87.
62 See id. at 306.
63 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Why these two rights must be distinguished is not entirely clear.
Agee quoted from Califano v. Aznavorian,64 wherein the Court recog-
nized "the crucial difference between the freedom to travel interna-
tionally and the right of interstate travel." 65 Califano explained that
the right to interstate travel is "virtually unqualified," whereas the
right to travel abroad is "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."66 Yet,
this statement is nothing more than a conclusion, and Agee offers no
explanation as to why this is true. The only hint of a rationale for this
disparate treatment comes from Califano, wherein the Court empha-
sized that, unlike the right to travel abroad, the right to interstate
travel has been "recognized by this Court for over 100 years.'67
If longevity (in terms of the number of years that a right is rec-
ognized by the Court) is the sole criterion for determining whether a
right to travel is fundamental, then the right to travel on public fora is
in trouble. The Court has never explicitly recognized this right. Just
last term in City of Chicago v. Morales,68 the Court declined to ad-
dress the issue of whether such a fundamental right exists.69 At the
very least, Agee and Morales suggest that the Court is unwilling to
extend the right to travel without some sort of independent justifica-
tion explaining why the specific right asserted is fundamental
70
In sum, the Court's interstate travel decisions do not lend them-
selves to an easy analogy to the right to travel on public fora. Most of
the decisions ascribe the right to interstate travel to a source that will
not support such an analogy. While the Due Process Clause will sup-
port such an analogy, the tenor of the Court's opinions suggests that it
will not recognize such a right without some sort of independent justi-
fication. Therefore, relying on interstate travel case law, without
more, to support a right to travel on public fora is inappropriate.
fA 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
6 Id. at 176.
66 Id. (quoting califano v. Tones, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1953)).
67 Id. (citations omitted).
6' 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
69 See id. at 1863 n.35 (basing decision on the statute being overbroad and therefore
holding that "it is unnecessary to reach the question whether the... ordinance is invalid as a
deprivation of substantive due process").
70 Such a justification is explored later in this Note. See infra Part III (discussing the right
to travel on public fora).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUVENILE RIGHTS
"Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of
by others must be protected against their own actions as well
as against external injury. " 71
The scope of juvenile rights under our Constitution remains un-
certain to this day.72 The rights of minors got off to an inauspicious
start in this century," but picked up steam during the Warren Court
years. 74 However, despite occasional broad pronouncements, 75 the
treatment of minors remains variable and uncertain.76 Perhaps the best
way to bring order to these decisions is to separate those that deal
with procedure from those that deal with substantive liberty interests.
A. Juvenile Rights and Procedural Due Process
Starting with In re Gault,77 the Court wrote a series of decisions
that were designed to reform the juvenile system. However, the cross-
over relevance of these decisions to the substantive liberty interests of
minors is probably minimal. These cases focused on the nature of the
juvenile court system and its deficiencies, not the liberation of mi-
nors.
In re Gault held that the rights to notice of charges, counsel, and
confrontation of accusers, as well as the right against compulsory
self-incrimination and the right to cross-examine witnesses, apply to
minors.78 The Court emphasized the importance of the procedural
safeguards required by the Due Process Clause, commenting that
"these instruments... enhance the possibility that truth will emerge
from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data."79
71 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 69 (Penguin Classics ed. 1974).
72 As Justice Marshall states in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976),
"[t]he question squarely presented by this case.., is whether the due process rights of juveniles
are entitled to lesser protection than those of adults. The prior decisions of this Court provide no
clear answer." Id at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
73 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ("No question is raised
concerning the power of the State ... to require that all children of proper age attend some
school .... ).
74 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969) (holding that "[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.").
75 See id (stating that students "are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect").
76 See Bykofsky, 429 U.S. at 965 (Marshall, I., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe prior deci-
sions of this court provide no clear answer" to the question of whether the due process rights of
minors are entitled to lesser protection than those of adults).
77 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78 See id. at 33,42,57.
7' Id. at 21.
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In sum, "procedure is to law what 'scientific method' is to science.
8 °
In re Gault rejected the argument that the civil nature of juvenile pro-
ceedings, which emphasize rehabilitation over punishment, made
them exempt from the ordinary requirements of the Due Process
Clause.81 The Court explained that "[u]nder our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 82
In re Winship83 and Breed v. Jones84 quickly followed In re
Gault. The two cases applied the "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard and Double Jeopardy Clause, respectively, to juvenile court
proceedings. Both of the cases focused on the serious consequences
of juvenile proceedings. In re Winship observed that "civil labels and
good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due
process safeguards in juvenile courts, 85 because delinquency pro-
ceedings are "comparable in seriousness" to felony prosecutions. In
Jones, the Court again focused on the nature of juvenile proceedings,
commenting that "in terms of potential consequences, there is little to
distinguish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case from
a traditional criminal prosecution." 87 Neither of the cases purported to
define the totality of the relationship between a minor and the state.
By way of contrast, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania88 the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply to
delinquency proceedings. 89 A plurality of the Court recognized the
failures of the juvenile court system,9° but emphasized that imposing
a right to trial by jury in a juvenile proceeding would turn it into an
adversary hearing without advancing the fact-finding process.
91
80 /d
8' See id. at 27. The Court stated that:
While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree of order
and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings to determine delinquency, and in con-
tested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will re-
quire that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite, nor
do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process requirements must
be observed with respect to hearings to determine the disposition of the delinquent
child.
Id.
8 Id. at 28.
'3 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
84 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
85 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66.
86 Id.
87 Jones, 421 U.S. at 530.
s8 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
89 See id. at 572.
90 See id. at 545.
91 As the plurality explained:
The Court has refrained, in the cases heretofore decided, from taking the easy way
with a flat holding that all rights constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to
be imposed upon the state juvenile proceeding ....
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With the sole exception of McKeiver, all of the procedural fights
afforded to adults in criminal proceedings are available to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings. The fact that the procedural rights of adults
and minors are virtually the same, however, does not mean that the
Court will readily conclude that the substantive rights of minors and
adults are the same. In procedural due process case law involving the
rights of minors, the Court has applied only those safeguards that it
felt were necessary to enhance the trustworthiness of juvenile pro-
ceedings. In each case, the Court was concerned with the procedural
fairness of the juvenile proceedings and did not attempt to equate the
rights of minors in a general sense to those of adults. Therefore, these
cases are not overly helpful when the issue is whether a juvenile has
the same right to liberty as an adult.
B. Juvenile Rights and Substantive Liberty
The Court has recognized that a minor's substantive rights are
not coextensive with those of adults. The Court first confronted this
issue in Prince v. Massachusetts,92 wherein the Court upheld Massa-
chusetts' child labor laws against a constitutional challenge brought
under the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment.93 The
child labor law prohibited minors under the age of twelve from selling
newspapers or periodicals in any street or public place.94 The Court
observed that the statute would be unconstitutional if it applied to
adults.95 Then, in an oft-quoted passage, the Court remarked:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults.... A democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that im-
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen
greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition
of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner.
Id at 545-47.
92 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
9' See id. at 169-70. Mrs. Prince, who had legal custody of Betty Simmons (age nine) was
a Jehovah's Witness who went door-to-door spreading her religious message. See id. at 162.
Betty went out with Mrs. Prince and carried magazines which, from time to time, she had sold at
the rate of five cents per copy. See id.
' See id. at 160-61.
95 See id. at 167 ("Concededly a statute or ordinance identical in terms with Section 69,
except that it is applicable to adults or all persons generally, would be invalid.") (citations
omitted). The Court further stated that "the mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this form
of adult activity.., does not mean it cannot do so for children." Id. at 168.
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plies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dan-
gers within a broad range of selection.
96
The precise dimensions of the state's authority over children are
still unclear. The Court has struggled over how to define the scope of
a minor's rights in cases dealing with the First Amendment rights of
minors, and those pertaining to a minor's right to privacy (including
the right to obtain an abortion). While these cases do not suggest a
precise test for determining the extent of a minor's substantive rights,
a couple of general principles are clear. First, the Court has never
started from scratch and asked whether a right that exists for adults
exists at all for children. In each case, the Court assumes that minors
have some constitutional protection. Second, the Court is more likely
to show deference to a state law that regulates the conduct of minors.
In several cases dealing with restrictions on the First Amendment
rights of minors, the Court has assumed that minors share many of the
rights possessed by adults. As the Court declared in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,9 7 minors "are possessed of fun-
damental rights which the State must respect., 98 In each of these
cases, the Court looked to the body of law it had already developed
for adults, and asked whether minors should be treated differently.
Clearly, minors do enjoy a substantial degree of protection under
the First Amendment. Thus, in Tinker the Court held that students had
a right to wear black armbands in class in protest of the war in Viet-
nam.99 Tinker emphasized that the classroom is quintessentially the
"marketplace of ideas,"'1 and minors learn best through exposure to a
plurality of ideas, rather than one authoritative account of the truth.'O°
96 Id. The Court went on to state that:
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults.
... What may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may not be so for children,
either with or without their parents' presence.
Id. at 169.
97 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
98 Id. at 511.
99 See id. at 514.
'00 Id. at 512. 
I
"01 See id. at 510-13. The school's decision to suspend students wearing arinbands was
based solely on the desire to avoid the controversy that would result from open opposition to the
Vietnam War. See id. at 510. The Court found that this action was a form of vieWpoint based
discrimination. See id. at 512-13.
Viewpoint-bsed discrimination upon ideas is particularly repugnant to the Constitution
in the arena of the First Amendment. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992). Moreover, as the Court noted in Tinker, "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace
of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection."' Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
[Vol. 50:681
CURFEW LAWS AND THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
The First Amendment rights of minors, however, do not extend to
speech that borders obscenity. In Ginsberg v. New YorkY12 the Court
held that a state may adjust its statutory definition of obscenity for
minors.103 Ginsberg emphasized that "even where there is an invasion
of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' ' °
4
The Court recognized that the state "has an independent interest in the
well-being of its youth."'105 The Court then upheld the statute, apply-
ing a rational basis test.
0 6
Even at the borders of protected speech, however, the state must
be careful not to prohibit too much. In Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville,10 7 the Court struck down a law that prohibited drive-in movie
theaters from showing movies that contained any nudity.108 One of the
arguments advanced by the city in defense of the law was that the
statute was a reasonable means of protecting minors from harm, citing
Ginsberg.'1 9 The Court rejected the argument, stating that "[s]peech
that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legiti-
mate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for
them.""I 0 Erznoznik acknowledged, however, that there are some ar-
eas where a child "'is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
102 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The issue in Ginsberg was whether a state may adjust its defini-
tion of obscenity for minors. See id at 631-32. A vendor was charged with selling "girlie"
magazines to a 16 year-old boy. See id The trial judge found that he had violated New York's
criminal obscenity statute. See id. The statute defined material containing nudity as harmful to
minors where it: "(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of mi-
nors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors." IL at 633.
"o3 See id. at 642-43.
104 Id. at 638 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
1o5 Id. at 640. The Court then quoted Chief Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals,
who stated that:
['lhe knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and
society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reason-
able regulation of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and
proper for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography
to children special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at
controlling dissemination of such material to adults.
People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333,334 (1965).
io6 390 U.S. at 641 ("The only question remaining, therefore, is whether the New York
Legislature might rationally conclude, as it has, that exposure to the materials proscribed by [the
obscenity law] constitutes such an 'abuse."').
107 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
,os See id. at 216-17.
'09 See id. at 212.
110 Id. at 213-14.
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choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guaran-
tees.'.'' The Court did not elaborate on what these areas include.
Another principle developed from the Court's case law concern-
ing minors is that legislative classifications concerning minors should
receive a greater degree of deference. The Court's right to privacy
jurisprudence pertaining to minors demonstrates this principle. While
the Court has been unable to agree on a standard of review to apply to
classifications that burden a minor's rights, all of the cases show a
greater degree of deference than the normal strict scrutiny standard of
review that is applied to classifications burdening the rights of adults.
The Court has struggled to formulate a test for alleged infringe-
ments of a minor's right to privacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,1 2 the Court considered the constitutionality of a parental con-
sent provision in Missouri's abortion statute.'1 3 Danforth framed the
test as "whether there is any significant state interest ... that is not
present in the case of an adult."
' 114
The following year, the Court considered whether a state may
prohibit the distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of
sixteen in Carey v. Population Services International.115 A plurality
of four applied the Danforth test. The plurality observed that this test
is "apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test
applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults."' 1 6 The plurality
found the lower standard appropriate because: (1) a state has greater
latitude to regulate the conduct of minors; and (2) minors have a
lesser capacity for making important decisions."
7
In Bellotti v. Baird,"8 a plurality elaborated on the reasons for
treating cases dealing with the rights of minors differently from those
concerning adults:
We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated
with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, ma-
.. Id. at 214 n.ll (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
112 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
13 See id. at 52. The applicable section of Missouri's abortion statute required that, in the
first twelve weeks of her pregnancy, the minor obtain the written consent of a parent or person
in loco parentis if she is under 18 and unmarried unless the abortion was necessary to save the
life of the mother. See id. at 58.
"4 Id. at 75.
15 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
116 Id. at 693 n.15.
117 See id.
" 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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ture manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.
19
Bellotti did not mention or apply the Danforth standard. In fact,
this standard has been all but forgotten in the Court's later decisions.
In H.L. v. Matheson,120 the Court reviewed an abortion statute as it
applied to a minor.' 21 At the end of the opinion, the Court stated that
the statute "plainly serves important state interests, is narrowly drawn
to protect only those interests, and does not violate any of the guar-
antees of the Constitution."'122 Unfortunately, the Court did not elabo-
rate on the test it was applying, and did not explain how the test was
supposed to be applied or what the individual factors meant.
More recently, in Hodgson v. Minnesota,123 the Court considered
whether a state's two-parent notification provision, without a judicial
bypass, violated the Constitution. 24 The Court again was confused by
the question of what standard to apply. Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor applied a rational basis test, citing Ginsberg.'2 Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, expressed the
view that minority status does not affect the nature of the right itself,
but only the state's interests.126 A four-Justice plurality observed that,
"[tlhe law does not give to children many rights given to adults, and
provides, in general, that children can exercise the rights they do have
only through and with parental consent."' 127 And while the plurality
purported to apply some form of rational basis review, in actuality
they looked much closer at the justifications for the statute than such
a standard of review would imply.
28
119 Id. at 634. For an explanation of what the plurality might have meant by these factors, it
is helpful to look at what it cited. When discussing a child's "peculiar vulnerability," the plural-
ity discussed the procedure cases set forth above, including In re Winship and In re Gault. See
i When discussing the child's inability to make important, affirmative choices, the Court cited
Justice Stewart's opinion in Prince and Ginsberg. See id. at 635-37. For a discussion of Winship
and Gault, see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. For an explanation of Prince and
Ginsberg, see supra notes 92-96, 102-06 and accompanying text.
120 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
121 See id at 398.
122 Id. at 413 (footnote omitted).
'3 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
124 See id at 424-25.
'2' See id at 448-49.
26 See id. at 464 ("Neither the scope of a woman's privacy right nor the magnitude of a
law's burden is diminished because a woman is a minor. Rather, a woman's minority status
affects only the nature of the State's interests.") (citations omitted).
127 Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
128 See id. at 483-501. Such justifications include the protection of a parent's right to par-
ticipate in the child's upbringing, the fostering of parent-child relationships, and a general so-
cietal interest. See id at 485-86.
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III, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ON PUBLIC FORA
"If I choose to take an evening walk to see if Andromeda has
come up on schedule, I think I am entitled to look for the
distant light of Almach and Mirach without finding myself
staring into the blinding beam of a police flashlight. " 29
There is no consensus among the lower courts regarding either
the existence of a fundamental right to travel on public fora or the
scope of such a right if it indeed exists. This Part offers a solution to
that controversy.
For the most part, the circuit split does not stem from an under-
lying doctrinal disagreement. Rather, the underlying factual circum-
stances in the circuit cases show that in each case the court is re-
sponding to somewhat different concerns. The constitutional right to
travel on public fora is properly understood as an aspect of substan-
tive due process. This right is rooted in our nation's history and tradi-
tions, and deserves recognition as a fundamental aspect of the "lib-
erty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Anxiety over the potential consequences of recognizing such a
right can be dispelled by adopting a modified formulation of the "un-
due burden" standard set forth by the joint opinion in Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey'3° to determine which level of scrutiny to apply to
alleged deprivations of this right.
A. Circuit Split: Doctrinal Disagreement or Sloppy Rights Talk?
The right to travel on public fora is frequently recognized by
courts in general terms as a right to freedom of movement. 13' The
failure of courts to describe this right precisely as a right to travel on
public fora has led to a needless and superficial disagreement
amongst the circuit courts over whether such a right exists. 13 2 The
129 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 n.6 (1972) (quoting Charles A.
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1172 (1966)).
130 505 U.S. 833, 873-78 (1992) (stating that not every burden that makes a right more
difficult to exercise is an infringement of that right and that the right is only violated if the state
imposes an undue burden on its exercise).
131 See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Citizens
have a fundamental right of free movement, 'historically part of the amenities of life as we have
known them."') (citations omitted); Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1970)
("[T]he right to travel is a fundamental personal right that can impinged only if necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest.") (footnote omitted). But see Lutz v. City of York,
899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing a fundamental "right to travel locally through
public spaces and roadways").
132 Cf Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U..Cm. L. Rnv. 1057, 1067 (1990). As the authors explain:
[A] right to be let alone cannot serve as a constitutional rule of decision. A right to
be let alone while doing what? While harming others? Harming others in what way?
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cases involve three distinct factual scenarios: (1) a "right to com-
mute;" 33 (2) a right to receive public housing in the context of dura-
tional residency requirements; 34 and (3) a right to travel freely within
a given jurisdiction, or a right to travel on public fora. 35
1. Right to Commute
The first scenario involves an employment situation where con-
stitutional rights may be waived by contract. Thus, it was unnecessary
for the courts to consider and reject a broadly described right to free-
dom of movement. 136 Further, these residency requirements are not
justified by a desire to discourage persons from migrating to a com-
munity, which is the purpose that Shaprio v. Thompson 37 found un-
constitutional. 38
Three of the four circuit courts that rejected an asserted right to
intrastate travel did so in the context of a "right to commute." In
Wardwell v. Board of Education,39 the Cincinnati Board of Education
adopted a resolution that required all teachers to establish residency in
the school district within ninety days of starting employment" 4° In
Andre v. Board of Trustees,'4' the Village of Maywood, Illinois
adopted a resolution that required all administrative personnel and
As determined by whom? These questions make clear the need for a less abstract
formulation of the right at stake ....
Id
133 Andre v. Bd. of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 52-53 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that residency
requirement for municipal employment did not impermissibly burden plaintiffs' right to inter-
state or intrastate travel); Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding
that there was no right to intrastate travel and upholding residency requirement for employ-
ment); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1975) (determining that there is
no support for a fundamental Constitutional "right to commute" which would require a compel-
ling governmental purpose).
13 See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding five
year residency requirement for admission to public housing violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Cole, 435 F.2d at 809 (finding that a two year residency requirement to qualify for
subsidized housing violated the Equal Protection Clause).
13- See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding
that because juveniles had no fundamental right to free movement, intermediate scrutiny was
proper, and upheld a curfew law); Nunez, 114 F.3d at 944-46 (applying strict scrutiny to over-
turn curfew law); Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a curfew
imposed by a county after a hurricane was not unconstitutionally vague and the court upheld the
restriction on travel); Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268-71 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold mu-
nicipal cruising ordinance).
136 See Andre, 561 F.2d at 53 (rejecting any right of intrastate travel outside of cases in-
volving durational residency requirements).
'J' 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
t See id. at 629 ("[The purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons... is constitu-
tionally impermissible.").
"' 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
'40 'See id. at 626.
"4' 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977).
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department heads to establish residency in Maywood within two
years; all other personnel were given four years to comply.142 Simi-
larly, in Wright v. City of Jackson,143 the City of Jackson, Mississippi
passed a statute that required all civil service employees to maintain
their domicile within the city limits during their period of employ-
ment.144
In each of these cases, the employees brought suit seeking to
overturn the statutes that required them to live within the jurisdiction
of their employment. In Andre, the court observed that under Shapiro,
the fact of residency itself was distinct from the durational residency
requirement, and that it was only the latter that is unconstitutional.' 4
The purpose of a residency requirement is to assure that city employ-
ees live in the community where they work. Employees who are sub-
ject to such a restriction are all subject to it equally. Thus, no group is
penalized for moving into the community "late."
More fundamentally, the difference between a residency re-
quirement in the Andre sense and the durational residency require-
ment of Shapiro is the privity between the Andre employee and the
government that passes the law. In Andre, Wright, and Wardwell, the
persons affected were governmental employees who were getting
paid for what they did. The residency requirement was merely a con-
dition of their employment. Thus, they gave up their rights by bar-
gaining for employment. 146 By way of contrast, Shapiro involved the
eligibility of persons for welfare payments. There was no contract
between these welfare recipients and the state.
2. Durational Residency Requirements
The decisions in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority 47. and Cole v. Housing Authority148 recognized a right to
142 See id. at 49.
143 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
'44 See id. at 901.
145 See Andre, 561 F.2d at 52 ("Bona fide residency requirements as continuing conditions
of municipal employment rest upon footings significantly different from those of durational
residency requirements.").
146 There is precedent for finding constitutional rights waived by signing a contract. See,
e.g., D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (holding that procedural due
process rights may be waived by contract where such a waiver is made "voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly .. "). However, such a waiver must be clear and must be made in cir-
cumstances that are not unconscionable. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1972)
(holding that due process rights cannot be waived by an adhesion contract which stated that
upon default a seller may repossess the merchandise).
'47 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971). The King court held that a five-year residency requirement
for admission to public housing was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
at 648.
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intrastate travel in the context of durational residency requirements
for public housing. These cases cannot be distinguished in any
meaningful sense from Shapiro. The durational residency require-
ments in King and Cole were justified by the same purposes that Sha-
piro found unconstitutional. It would be surprising if the constitution-
ality of such an ordinance turned on the issue of whether it deterred
migration by those living in another state, or deterred migration by
both those living in another state and people seeking to relocate from
a different city within the same state.
Such a result might be squared with Shapiro if the case was
based solely upon principles of federalism and a notion of dual citi-
zenship.1 49 Shapiro, however, also rested on grounds of personal lib-
erty. 50 Thus, to the extent that a durational residency requirement
infringes on concepts of personal liberty, such a requirement may be
unconstitutional when practiced only against citizens of the same
state.' 5' As the Second Circuit stated, within this context "[i]t would
be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fun-
damental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a cor-
relative constitutional right to travel within a state.'
' 52
3. Right to Travel on Public Fora
Three of the four circuits that have addressed the issue of
whether there is a right to travel on public fora found such a right.
The Ninth Circuit recognized this right in broad terms in a case in-
volving a juvenile curfew law.153 The Eleventh Circuit recognized this
right in the context of an emergency curfew applicable to both chil-
148 435 F.2d 807 (Ist Cir. 1970). Cole held that a two-year residency requirement for ad-
mission to public housing was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. See id. at 813-
14.
149 See, e.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77 (1872). Elaborating upon the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court stated:
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as
you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or im-
pose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the
measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
Id.
150 As the Shapiro Court explained:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our con-
stitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (emphasis added).
151 A full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
112 King, 442 F.2d at 648.
153 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
right of travel by children is fundamental and thus applying strict scrutiny analysis to a munici-
pal juvenile ordinance).
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dren and adults.154 Finally, the Third Circuit recognized the "right to
travel locally through public spaces and roadways" in the context of
an anti-cruising ordinance. 155 Only the D.C. Circuit refused to recog-
nize such a right.
156
Judge Silberman's plurality opinion in Hutchins v. District of
Columbia157 subsumes a child's minority status into the definition of
the right itself.'58 Judge Silberman justifies this choice on judicial re-
straint grounds. The more general the definition of the right is, the
argument runs, the easier it is to extend the bounds of substantive due
process.159 Thus, to ensure against unlicensed judicial lawmaking, the
right must be described at "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can beidentified. ' '16°
Ironically, in the context of a right to free movement, the oppo-
site is true. As this Part demonstrates, the main reason why this right
has not won universal approval is because it remains in abstract form
and thus encompasses a wide range of interests (some of which
should not enjoy fundamental right status).16 1 Furthermore, incorpo-
rating a child's minority status into the definition of an asserted fun-
damental right is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.1
62
15 See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (1lth Cir. 1996) (holding that the right to travel
may be temporarily limited or suspended in emergency situations).
151 Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1990). The court held that one's
right to move about town implicates the Due Process Clause. See id. at 268. However, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny, and not strict scrutiny, to the anti-cruising ordinance. See id. at
268-70.
156 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(concluding, in a plurality opinion, that juveniles do not have a fundamental right, without adult
supervision, to be on the streets).
157 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
158 See id. at 538 ("[W]e must ask not whether Americans enjoy a general right of free
movement, but rather whatever are the scope and dimensions of such a right (if it exists), do
minors have such a substantive right?").
IS9 See id. ("[T]he more general is the right's description, Le., the free movement of peo-
ple, the easier is the extension of substantive due process.").
160 Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1988)). Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, took an approach to identifying and defining fundamental rights that
has been subjected to harsh criticism. See, e.g., Tribe & Dorf, supra note 132, at 1086 (arguing
that Scalia's approach is not value-neutral, and that there is no one way to measure the appropri-
ate level of generality for an asserted right).
161 One of the main problems with the approach taken by Justice Scalia in Michael H, see
supra note 160 and accompanying text, is that it provides no criterion for achieving the proper
degree of specificity. A definition may be narrow along one axis, yet broad along another.
Thus, while my definition of the right to travel on public fora is more general in the sense that it
includes minors, it is also more specific. Unlike a generalized right to free movement (which
could be read to authorize travel anywhere), the right as I define it does not prima facie include
a right to trespass on private property or gain unauthorized admittance to secure government
buildings.
162 See supra Part lI.B (tracing the Supreme Court's development of substantive rights for
juveniles).
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The Third Circuit found a fundamental "right to travel locally
through public spaces and roadways" in the Due Process Clause.
163
The court conceded that "this bottom-line judgment is unquestionably
ad hoc, to some extent."'164 The Third Circuit seemed terrified by the
consequences of not finding such a right,165 and felt that recognition
of this right "is a judgment we are required to make."166
The right to move freely involved in scenario three above is of a
different magnitude, if not a different kind, than the right implicated
in scenario two. It is one thing to discourage a family from changing
their residency, and quite another to discourage them from leaving
their house at all. Therefore, it simply will not do to put both of these
rights together into the general category of "freedom of move-
ment." 167 While the one right could be described as the "right to mi-
grate with intent to reside," the other must be described as the right to
travel on public fora.1
68
B. The Right to Travel on Public Fora
The right to travel on public fora is a liberty interest that is pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
169
161 Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990).
164 Id.
165 See id. ("Under York's view, a state or local government could constitutionally prohibit
all freedom of movement that does not involve interstate migration, interstate commerce, busi-
ness between a citizen and the federal government, and (presumably) travel incident to other-
wise protected activity.").
166Id.
167 These two rights should also be kept separate because they draw upon separate histo-
ries. For a history of the right to migration, see CHAFEE, supra note 57, at 176-93 (describing
the history of migratory freedom between the English colonies, the relevant language in the
Articles of Confederation, and the rights' history since the adoption of our Constitution). The
right to travel on public fora has its own common law history. See infra Part Il.B.
'3 This latter right is developed more clearly below. See infra Part lH.B.
169 Perhaps no portion of the Court's jurisprudence has created more controversy than its
forays into substantive due process. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063,
1068-89 (1981) (canvassing various arguments for and against the legitimacy of fundamental
rights). Many scholars have defended the Court's expansive decisions by arguing that certain
moral principles underlie the abstract phrase "due process of law," and that these principles
must be recognized and adhered to if our government is to be considered democratic. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 1249, 1264 (1997) ("Majority rule is democratic only when certain prior
conditions-the democratic conditions of equal membership-are met and sustained."); James
E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (1995) ("[D]ue process
should secure a forward-looking antitotalitarian principle, criticizing historical practices that
deny the promise of liberty ....") (citation omitted). Critics of the Court have argued that these
decisions are anti-democratic and do not respect the Constitution's original meaning. See
ANTONIN SCALA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 41 (1997) ("Neither the text of such a document nor the
intent of its framers (whichever you choose) can possibly lead to the conclusion that its only
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Indeed, this liberty interest has always been protected from en-
croachment by the Due Process Clause. It is a mirror-like reflection
of the historical meaning of due process; namely, "liberty from bodily
restraint., 170 As such, it is a fundamental right that may not be
abridged without demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.
1. The Magna Charta and English Common Law
"The phrase, 'life, liberty or property without due process of
law' came to us from the English common law."'171 "Due process of
law" is the rough equivalent of the phrase "by the law of the land"
that appears in the thirty-ninth article of Magna Charta. 172 The latter
phrase includes freedom from bodily restraint. 73 As one author ex-
plains, "[a]ltogether, it may be said that the history of the growth and
development of the right of personal liberty is the main element in the
history of early English constitutional law."'174
Unsurprisingly, when Blackstone spoke of the rights of persons
in his commentaries on the English law, he included "personal lib-
erty." "[P]ersonal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place
one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law.' 75 If the right to exercise one's "power
effect is to take the power of changing rights away from the legislature and give it to the
courts."). The Court itself has responded to this conflict by stating that "[a]s a general matter,
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citation omitted).
In an effort to reconcile these competing visions of the judicial role, the Court has at-
tempted to limit the liberties recognized as fundamental under the due process clause to those
"which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citation omitted). This inquiry is backward-looking
and protects against short-term departures from historical practices. See County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 858 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170 On several occasions, the Supreme Court confirmed that freedom from bodily restraint
is at the core of the liberty protected by the due process clause. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause .... ") (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-674 (1977) ("While the contours of ... [the
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause] have not been defined precisely, they have
always been thought to encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.").
171 Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the 14th Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV.
431, 440 (1926) (stating that under the common law, "liberty" meant simply liberty of the per-
son or, in other words, the right to have one's person free from bodily restraint).
172 See Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in those Clauses in
the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARv. L.
REv. 365, 372-73 (1891).
173 See id at 375 (stating that in the American context, the term "liberty" entails freedom
of the person from restraint).
174 Id. at 376.
175 1 WILLIAm BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *134.
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of loco-motion" did not exist, "there would soon be an end of all
other rights and immunities. ' '1 76
This right was so important that it could not be revoked except in
an emergency.17 7 "'Next to a man's life the nearest thing that con-
cerns him is freedom of his person ; for indeed, what is imprisonment
but a kind of civil death?"",7 8 In this sense, the right to personal lib-
erty is an autonomy right that arises out of respect for the dignity of
the person.
A government violated the right to personal liberty whenever a
person was imprisoned without cause. Imprisonment was defined
broadly, so that "[t]he confinement of the person, in any wise, is an
imprisonment.' ' 79 Thus, confining a person to the boundaries of his
own home was an imprisonment, as was forcibly detaining him in the
street.
1 80
2. Supreme Court Case Law
This central meaning of the Due Process Clause (protecting a
citizen's freedom from bodily restraint) 81 is so well understood that it
is an afterthought in the Court's opinions. Beginning with Meyer v.
Nebraska182 and continuing through Foucha v. Louisiana,'83 the Court
has consistently assumed that the Due Process Clause "encompass[es]
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment."' 84 Indeed, the Court
has been "careful not to 'minimize the importance and fundamental
nature' of the individual's right to liberty."'
8 5
A necessary corollary of this freedom from bodily restraint is the
right of a citizen to "remove from one place to another according to
inclination."' 86 The ability to move about within a community is
"simply another way of saying that you are not imprisoned.' 87 Thus,
"freedom of locomotion may well be treated as a part of freedom of
176 Id. at *134-35.
'77 Id. at *"135.
18 Shattuck, supra note 172, at 378 (quoting CARE'S ENGLISH LIBERTIES 185 (1721)).
79 BLACKSTONE, supra note 175, at 135.
Iso See id.
181 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT 6
(1955) ("In fact, though the word liberty in the due process clause has come over the years to be
filled with much additional content, this meaning ... is the primary and historical meaning.").
's2 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Meyer Court stated that "[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint." Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
183 504 U.S. 71 (1992). The Foucha Court declared that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint
has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action." Id. at 80 (citation omitted).
184 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
s Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,750 (1987)).
" 6 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
187 TENBROEK, supra note 181, at 6.
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restraint of the person."188 This freedom has been recognized in the
Court's dicta.
The Court's decisions holding loitering and vagrancy laws un-
constitutional on vagueness grounds frequently allude to the existence
of such a right. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,189 the Court
stated that walking and strolling are "historically part of the amenities
of life as we have known them."'19 Again, in Kolender v. Lawson
191
the Court observed that a loitering ordinance "implicates considera-
tion of the constitutional right to freedom of movement.' ' tg Finally, in
City of Chicago v. Morales93 a plurality of the court declared that
"[w]e have expressly identified this 'right to remove from one place
to another according to inclination' as 'an attribute of personal lib-
erty' protected by the Constitution."'194 The plurality did not consider
whether this right would support a substantive due process chal-
lenge.1
95
The right to travel on public fora is also logically implied by the
right to interstate travel itself, whose existence is no longer ques-
tioned.196 At least prior to the 20th century and the invention of the
airplane (and perhaps the 19th century and the invention of the loco-
motive engine), it is difficult to imagine how one could exercise their
right to interstate travel without the use of public sidewalks and
roadways. Even now, most people must use public streets and side-
walks to access airports. Thus, recognition of a right to interstate
travel compels the recognition of a right to travel on public fora, lest
the former right be reduced to a dead letter.
C. The Right to Travel and an "Undue Burden"
Restrictions on the right to travel on public fora that eliminate
the utility of the right should be unconstitutional unless justified by a
"compelling governmental interest." It does not follow, however, that
all restrictions that incidentally burden this right need to satisfy this
high threshold. As the Supreme Court has explained:
18 Warren, supra note 171, at 450. Warren stated that William v. Fears did not add, sub-
stantively, anything to the Due Process Clause. See id.
"9 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
'9o Id. at 164.
'9' 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
192 Id. at 358.
193 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
194 Id. at 1857 (citation omitted).
'9' See id. at 1863 n.35 ("[lit [is] unnecessary to reach the question whether the... ordi-
nance is invalid as a deprivation of substantive due process.").
196 See supra Part I (tracing the development of the right to interstate travel).
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The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order
to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent
with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safe-
guarding the good order upon which they ultimately de-
pend.19
7g
Thus, the question is how much of an impact must a regulation have
before it is considered an infringement of a fundamental right.
The Third Circuit dealt with this issue in Lutz v. City of York. 198
The Lutz court proposed an "intermediate" standard of review for all
alleged violations of the right to intrastate travel, relying on Supreme
Court precedents in the arena of time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech. 199 The court reasoned that "[i]f the freedom of speech it-
self can be so qualified, then surely the unenumerated right of local-
ized travel can be as well."2° The Lutz court recognized that content-
197 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,574 (1941).
,98 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). The Lutz court framed the issue as follows: "We believe
that reviewing all infringements on the right to travel under strict scrutiny is just as inappropri-
ate as applying no heightened scrutiny to any infringement on the right to travel not implicating
the structural or federalism-based concerns of the more well-established precedents." Id. at 269.
199 See id. In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court held that the cruising ordinance
"will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to meet significant city objectives." Id. at 270.
20 Id at 269. The Court gave two justifications for this analogy. First, the Court stated that
not all "burden[s] on First Amendment rights [are] sufficiently serious to trigger heightened
scrutiny." Id. at 270 n.41. This is true, but largely beside the point. Similar distinctions have
been made in case law dealing with privacy rights as well. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), the Court considered a Wisconsin statute which prevented parents who paid child sup-
port and who did not have custody of the child from marrying without court approval. See id. at
375. The Court observed that only regulations which "interfere directly and substantially with
the right to marry" were subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 386-87. The
Zablocki court then distinguished Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), which involved a pro-
vision of the Social Security Act that cut off disability benefits to a person who married some-
one who was not separately entitled to benefits. See id. at 48. The Court distinguished Califano
on the ground that the burden in Zablocki was more direct and substantial an interference with
the right to marry. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12 ("The statutory classification at issue
here, [in contrast to Califano], clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry."). As one scholar has observed, "[tihe only reason for the more rigorous scrutiny applied
in Zablocki is the fact that the burden on the right to marry in that case was more severe than it
was in Califano." Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 896 (1994). Thus, the fact that First
Amendment jurisprudence has a mechanism for dealing with insubstantial burdens does not by
itself justify this analogy.
Second, the Lutz court found the First Amendment analogy helpful because of the Su-
preme Court's forum analysis. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 270 n.41. The court reasoned that, just as
heightened scrutiny is appropriate in speech cases only where the forum is a public one, it is
also appropriate in "localized" travel cases only where the forum is a public one. See id. This is
true, but the same problem may be addressed by carefully describing the right. My description
of the right to travel on public fora encompasses the fora that are considered by the Court to be
public. Therefore, the analogy is unnecessary in this respect as well.
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based restrictions on speech merit strict scrutiny,20' but felt that the
content-neutrality requirement in free speech cases had "no obvious
analog in the travel context."
20 2
Content-based restrictions on speech are treated differently from
content-neutral restrictions because "content discrimination 'raises
the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace."' 2 03 A regulation is content-neutral
when it is justified not by hostility to the content of the speech, but by
the "secondary effects" of the speech on the community.2°4 As Profes-
sor Dorf explains, "[clontent-based regulations aim at the communi-
cative impact of communicative activity, whereas content-neutral
regulations merely have an adverse effect on communicative oppor-
tunity."205 Thus, content-neutral regulations impose, at most, inci-
dental burdens on core First Amendment values.
Missing from the Lutz test is a mechanism for distinguishing
burdens on the right to travel on public fora that are incidental (such
as traffic lights) from those that are direct (such as a curfew law).
The Lutz test treats both categories of burdens identically. As a con-
sequence, the Lutz test is both overprotective and underprotective.
The test is overprotective because it would require that traffic
signals, stop signs, and right-of-way designations survive an interme-
diate standard of review. These regulations are meant to facilitate the
right to travel, not burden it. They are necessary to keep the roadways
safe. Without them, the right to travel as we know it would not exist
because streets would be covered with traffic accidents. Cities should
not be forced to prepare detailed analyses of the purposes of each stop
sign to justify them. Unless the placement of traffic signals and the
like causes a substantial disruption of a person's ability to travel, such
burdens should not be subject to heightened scrutiny at all.
Lutz is also underprotective because it evaluates direct burdens
on the right to travel on public fora under an intermediate standard of
review. Traditionally, laws that directly burden a fundamental right
must survive strict scrutiny by demonstrating that they are narrowly
201 See id. at 270 nA0 ("Only content-neutral restrictions are subjected to intermediate
scrutiny in the public fora cases. Content-specific restrictions, by contrast, must survive strict
scrutiny.") (citation omitted).
2Mid.
203 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
204 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (holding that a
zoning ordinance that prohibited theaters from showing non-obscene pornographic films was
content neutral because it was justified by the secondary effects of adult theaters on the commu-
nity, including prostitution).
205 Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1201 (1996).
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drawn to serve a compelling governmental interest.20 6 There is no
compelling reason for treating the right to travel on public fora differ-
ently from all other fundamental rights.
The best method for distinguishing between those burdens that
justify heightened scrutiny and those that do not is the "undue bur-
den" standard adopted by a plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey.20 7 This is a threshold inquiry.20 8 Once an undue burden is found,
the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny. If there is no "undue bur-
den," then the regulation merely has to pass rational basis review.
This mechanism eliminates the problems of overinclusion and un-
derinclusion that are caused by the Lutz test.
A statute or regulation constitutes an undue burden where it "has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path" of
the exercise of the right.20 9 Thus, the inquiry is whether a state or mu-
nicipality has placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a person's
right to travel on public fora. The right to travel on public fora is one
of those rights that, as Professor Doff explains, "presuppose[s] the
existence of conditions such that a regulation that appears to burden a
right could actually be consistent with the assumptions that define the
right."210 As the Lutz court observed, certain types of regulations are
necessary for the right to travel upon public parks, sidewalks, and
roadways to have meaning2 1 This right assumes that regulations
providing for a right-of-way and other necessities for organized and
orderly travel exist; otherwise, accidents occur and every hour ends
206 See id. at 1177-78 (distinguishing between strict level of scrutiny applied to laws that
directly burden a fundamental right and more deferential scrutiny applied to laws that only
incidentally burden a fundamental right).
207 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the plurality evaluated the constitutionality of six sepa-
rate provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute. See id. at 879-901. The plurality found the
statute's definition of medical emergency, informed consent requirement, 24-hour waiting pe-
riod requirement, parental consent requirement, and most of the record keeping and reporting
requirements to be constitutional. See id. at 880-87, 899-901. The plurality found the spousal
notification provision, and the portion of the reporting requirement which mandated that a
woman failing to notify her spouse give a reason for that failure, to be unconstitutional. See id.
at 887-98, 901.
20' See Brownstein, supra note 200, at 879-80. This author argues that the Casey plurality
collapses the threshold standard with the strict scrutiny analysis in the context of abortion. This
argument stems from the Court's understanding of the "right/infringementljustification interre-
lation," which assumes that there is no "sufficiently compelling interest" before viability that
would warrant that level of interference with a woman's right to choose an abortion. See id.
209 Id. at 878 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
210 Doff, supra note 205, at 1226.
211 As the Lutz court explained:
[Tihe right to travel cannot conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever
and however one pleases-even on roads specifically designed for public travel.
Unlimited access to public fora or roadways would result not in maximizing indi-
viduals' opportunity to engage in protected activity, but chaos.
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990).
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up looking like rush hour. In other words, a right to travel assumes a
right to orderly travel and not merely disjointed movement in an ab-
stract sense.
Thus, a strict scrutiny standard of review should only apply to
incidental burdens on the right to travel that do not facilitate its exer-
cise and impose, in the words of Casey, a "substantial obstacle" in the
path of the exercise of this right. This inquiry is objective and from
the point of view of the individual traveller.212 If such an obstacle
does not exist, then rational basis review is warranted.
Under such a standard, Lutz is an easy case. An "anti-cruising"
ordinance is clearly facilitative of the right to travel upon public
streets. It has as its principal objective the removal of traffic conges-
tion, which is necessary for orderly and efficient travel. The ordi-
nance does not place a substantial obstacle in the way of anyone exer-
cising their fundamental right to travel upon public streets. It merely
requires persons to travel with some particular destination in mind, or,
if not, that one at least wanders aimlessly rather than in circles.
Adopting such a standard with respect to all adults will secure a
citizen's right to travel on public fora while minimizing unwarranted
judicial interference with respect to the legitimate regulatory concerns
of states and local governments. Assuming that the regulation does
impose an undue burden, this Note now turns to the question of
whether the same standard of review (e.g., strict scrutiny) should ap-
ply to the rights of juveniles.
212 The Seventh Circuit, in Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), took a dif-
ferent position. Writing for the majority, Judge Easterbrook stated that:
[O]ur best estimate is that 'undue' rather than 'burden' is the key word, and that
'undue' means not only 'substantial' (a small cost or inconvenience is not 'undue')
but also that the burden must be undue in relation to the woman's interests, rather
than undue in relation to the court's assessment of society's interests.
Id. at 874. Judge Posner, however, adopted the view that courts should conduct the inquiry from
an objective standpoint. He accordingly stated that "if a statute burdens constitutional rights and
all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for express-
ing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue." Il at 88 1.
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IV. FINDING A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR JUVENILE RIGHTS
"But the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive ofpifalls;
it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise
to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are
qualified. 2 13
The Supreme Court's confusing pronouncements on the issue of
juvenile rights214 forced the lower courts to deduce a standard of re-
view to apply when considering the constitutional rights of minors
under curfew laws. It should come as little surprise that the results
have not been uniform. Much of the confusion revolves around the
Court's opinion in Bellotti v. Baird.215 Although the Bellotti plurality
viewed its criteria as a rationale for treating the rights of minors dif-
ferently in a general sense,216 lower courts have latched onto this
opinion as providing a test for whether or not the rights of minors
should be treated differently.217
Many of these courts have applied the Bellotti factors to the right
asserted.218 Others have applied these factors to the nature of the gov-
ernment's interests.219 None of the courts that have applied these fac-
tors to either prong of the analysis offered an elaborate or fully ade-
quate justification for why they have applied Jiellotti.
A. Fundamental Rights and the Strict Scrutiny Alternative
As noted above, no clear standard of review has emerged for
analyzing the constitutional rights of juveniles. Many courts and com-
213 American Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358
(1921).
214 See supra Part Hl (tracing Supreme Court development ofjuvenile rights).
21- 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
216 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997); Gaffney v. Allentown, Civ. No. 97-4455,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14565 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.
Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179
(Iowa 1992); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989); Brown v. Ashton, 611
A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Allen 4. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1987); Washington v. J.D., 937 P.2d 630 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); see also Note,
Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1163, 1175-80 (1984) [hereinafter Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution] (ar-
guing that courts should apply the Belloti criteria in assessing curfew ordinances to determine
whether such ordinances serve any interests that are compelling for children).
218 See, e.g., Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 541-42; Gaffizey, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14565, at
*13-*14.
219 See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945-46.
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mentators continue to advocate a strict scrutiny standard.220 Courts that
advocate the use of a fundamental rights/strict scrutiny analysis for
regulations burdening children typically do so with the caveat that
children's rights may be burdened to a greater extent than those of
adults.221 Ordinarily, when a fundamental right or suspect class is bur-
dened by a legislative classification, that classification is subjected to
strict scrutiny and struck down unless the state has a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and the legislation is narrowly tailored to further
that interest.222 However, proponents of fundamental rights for chil-
dren do not argue that the strict scrutiny analysis should be applied in
this form. Instead, they argue that courts should apply a "modified"
form of strict scrutiny that recognizes interests that are "compelling for
children. ' 2 3
In order to determine which interests are compelling for children,
courts and commentators that follow this mode of analysis have usu-
ally looked to Bellotti v. Baird.224 The Bellotti plurality identified
three factors which justify differential treatment for the constitutional
rights of children: (1) a child's "peculiar vulnerability"; (2) a child's
"inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner";
and (3) the role of the parent in the development of the child'225
Courts that afford minors fundamental rights then look to the Bellotti
220 See generally Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Appeal
in Maricopa County, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484
N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992); Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); see also
Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances, 24 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBs. 381, 415 (1991) (arguing in favor of a form of
strict scrutiny analysis which would recognize those state interests that are "compelling for
children"); Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 217, at 1171 (arguing that chil-
dren's rights should be viewed as fundamental, and that courts should apply strict scrutiny to
analyze constitutional challenges on the basis of those rights).
221 See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 ("[M]inors' rights are not coextensive with the rights
of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement of mi-
nors' rights.").
2 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("When race-
based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test .... ").
2 Horowitz, supra note 220, at 415. As another commentator explains:
The principle of strict scrutiny for infringements of fundamental rights presupposes
a universe of citizens equal under the Constitution; what qualifies as a compelling
state interest does not ordinarily vary depending on which citizens are affected ....
Thus, to recognize special interests surrounding one unique class of citizens-chil-
dren-is to recognize the need for a unique form of strict scrutiny. Such a form of
review would acknowledge compelling state interests that pertain only to children.
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 217, at 1171-72 (citation omitted).
124 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
225 Id. at 634.
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factors to ascertain if there is a compelling interest that justifies the
curfew ordinances.226
This analysis improperly conflates concerns relevant to defining
fundamental rights with those appropriate to ascertaining compelling
governmental purposes. Fundamental rights are negative rights-they
restrict the sphere of government action.227 Compelling governmental
interests, on the other hand, justify why the government has acted.228
Whereas fundamental rights concern liberties retained by the people,
compelling interests concern a government's need to act in a certain
229situation.
A minor's vulnerability, or inability to make critical decisions,
pertains to whether (or not) a child has a fundamental right, not
whether the government has a compelling interest. Many fundamental
rights stem from a personal interest in autonomy. As Professor Fallon
explains:
As beings who are capable of self-direction, we have an
interest in being able to make decisions for ourselves and
to act on those decisions that is sometimes independent of
the interest in having the decision made that will be best
for us in the sense of producing the greatest after-the-fact
well-being.230
This interest, however, presupposes the capacity to act as a fully
autonomous person.231 Where this capacity is not fully present, this
226 See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 ("The Bellotti framework enables courts to determine
whether the state has a compelling interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on
adults.") (citations omitted); In re Appeal of Maricopa County, 887 P.2d 599, 606-07 (phrasing
the issue as "whether a significant state interest not present in the case of an adult justifies in-
fringing upon minors' fundamental rights"); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179,
185-86 (Iowa 1992) (citing Bellotti to state that "an ordinance which restricts minors' rights to
an extent greater than it restricts adults' rights may be sustained if the State or municipality
demonstrates that it protects minors' peculiar vulnerability, accounts for their lesser ability to
make sound judgments, and reflects society's deference to the guiding role of parents").
227 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1105, 1115 (1994) (distinguishing between rights, which are negative because they restrict what
government can do, and interests, which involve justifications for why government has affirma-
tively acted).
22' See id.
2,' See id.
230 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.
REV. 343, 354 (1993) (footnote omitted).
2- See David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 964
(1979). As this commentator explains, two critical assumptions underly all concepts of human
rights: "first, that persons have the capacity to be autonomous in living their life [sic); second,
that persons are entitled, as persons, to equal concern and respect in exercising their capacities
for living autonomously." Id. (emphasis in original).
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
interest (and afortiori the constitutional rights that it supports) is di-
minished.
Saying that a minor is "vulnerable," or that he or she is unable to
make critical decisions, is simply another way of stating that minors
do not yet possess the capacity to act as fully autonomous persons.
The lesser capacity of minors is well established in the law. As Pro-
fessor Hafen observes, "it [is] of profound importance in all legal in-
quiries involving children that minors are presumed by all phases of
the law (and by the culture reflected by our law) not to have the same
basic capacities as adults. ' 232 In this vein, Bellotti merely reiterated
what the common law already understood, which is that children do
not possess the same capacity to act autonomously that adults have. 33
Since minors do not possess this capacity, their rights are not
fundamental in the same sense that adult rights are fundamental. This
is not to say that a minor's rights have no value, or, even worse, that a
minor has no rights. As Judge Rogers explained in Hutchins v. Dis-
trict of Columbia,234 "minors and adults share basic rights, but these
rights have less force when used by minors as shields against regula-
tion."235 Because the rights of minors have less force as shields
against regulation, a strict scrutiny standard of review is inappropri-
ate.
The foregoing discussion assumes that capacity is relevant to the
definition and assertion of fundamental rights. A more radical ap-
proach to children's rights argues that capacity should not be relevant
to the consideration of constitutional rights, and that children should
be endowed with fundamental rights because they are powerless vis-
a-vis the state.236 The view that children should be afforded funda-
mental rights because they are powerless vis-t-vis the state seeks to
equate children with historically oppressed groups, such as women
and African Americans.237
232 Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REv. 605, 646-47 (1976).
233 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
234 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en bane).
235 Id. at 563.
236 See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1315, 1350 (1995) (describing the empowerment rights theory, under which fundamental
rights would inhere in children because of their powerlessness as to the state). This argument
may be taken as an attempt to classify minors as a "discrete and insular minority" within the
meaning of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggest-
ing that review of statutes targeted at constitutional rights of particular groups may be subjected
to judicial scrutiny more exacting than the rational basis test). The Court rejected a similar ar-
gument made by senior citizens that they should enjoy status as a suspect classification because
of their age. See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
237 See Federle, supra note 236, at 1340-44 (comparing the experience of children to slav-
ery and the civil rights movement).
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The argument, for example, is that African-American slaves, like
minors, were treated paternalistically by most whites.238 Slaves were
viewed much like children, and thus their relationship with their
owner was seen to be similar to that of child to parent.239 Looking
back through the lens of history, it is clear "that the infantilization of
African-Americans was nothing more than an attempt to control and
oppress an entire race."'240 Similarly, rights theories that do not allow
for children as rights-holders perpetuate "these traditions of power
and dominance. ' 241 Thus, children must be afforded rights so that
they can challenge the existing hierarchies and power structures. 42
However, there are relevant differences between children and
other oppressed social groups that make this analogy weak. First, the
interests of the "power holders," or those institutions that perpetuate
the existing hierarchies, are different. Whereas oppressors have an
interest in maintaining oppression, those who preside over the lives of
children have an interest in terminating the child's dependent condi-
tion.243 Thus, to the extent that the motivations of the state are a con-
cern, there is less likelihood of an illicit motive in the case of chil-
dren.24
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, childhood is not a
permanent state. In this sense, a child's lack of power is less perma-
nent than that of a slave.245 While a slave will always be a slave, a
child will not always be a child. The slave's only remedy is to be be-
stowed with rights. The child has a further remedy-she may grow
up.246 In this sense, childhood is not an immutable characteristic, and
children thus lack one of the features that have historically qualified a
23 See id. at 1343 (arguing that even though some slave owners had sexual relations with
their slaves, these owners dared not treat them as equals for fear of sacrificing control over
them).
29 See id. (describing the position held by many that slaves, like children, had reduced
mental capacity and were thus dependent on their masters for guidance and protection).
240 ld. at 1344. The author continues to note that slaves were not seen as rights-holders, and
the notion that slaves would have been able to exercise such rights was inconceivable to whites.
See id.
241 jd.
242 See id. (arguing that the experience of African-American slaves demonstrates the im-
potence of rights that are incapable of challenging existing hierarchies).
243 See ONORA O'NEILL, Children's Rights and Children's Lives, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
RE-VISIONED 38 (Rosalind Eckman Ladd ed. 1996).
244 See Laurence H. Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presump-
tions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROBS. 8, 10 n.8 (1975) ("No adult, having
once been a child, can with real conviction draw the line between "us" and "them" -the line
that makes it at least plausible in other contexts to treat "them" as a special minority needing
protection from politics.").
245 See O'NEILL, supra note 243, at 38.
24 See id. at 39.
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group as a discrete and insular minority.247 Therefore, a strict scrutiny
standard of review is inappropriate.
B. The Need for Something More than Rational Basis Review
Only two courts hold that the appropriate standard of review is
the rational basis test.248 Their main argument is that a minor's liberty
interest is circumscribed by his or her inability to exercise the right
maturely.2 49 Since minors are more vulnerable than adults, and be-
cause minors may commit delinquent acts due to their immaturity, the
child's right to freedom of movement is not fundamental. Therefore, a
rational basis standard of review is appropriate because no funda-
mental right is implicated. 250
This argument has superficial appeal because it accurately de-
scribes the Court's two-tiered mode of analysis in due process cases.
Either a regulation burdens fundamental rights and is subject to strict
scrutiny, or it does not and is judged under rational basis review. In
the end, however, this is not an adequate justification for evaluating
statutes burdening a minor's rights under the same deferential stan-
dard that courts use when evaluating legislation that impacts eco-
nomic rights2 1
Clearly, children do not have substantive liberty rights in the
same sense, and of the same scope, as adults.252 There is a major logic
gap, however, between this premise and the conclusion that rational
basis review is required. The conclusion rests on the further premise
247 Professor Federle challenges the relevance of these distinctions, commenting that
"[a]ny form of oppression has negative consequences and should be intolerable in a rights-
oriented society." Federle, supra note 236, at 1344 n.198.
248 See In re J.AL, 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Col. 1989); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d
363,368-69 (Iowa 1989).
249 See In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 223; Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 369. This argument derives
from the three factors enunciated by the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
25 See In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 223 (concluding that a minor's "liberty interest in freedom
of movement does not constitute a fundamental right" and accordingly stating that the curfew
law at issue will be measured by "the rationality standard"); Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368-69
(Iowa 1989) ("[A] minor's right of intracity travel is not a fundamental right for due process
purposes, and the ordinance need not meet a strict scrutiny test.").
251 See Juvenile Curfevs and the Constitution, supra note 217, at 1172 n.44 ("The rights
of children should not be subordinated to the will of the majority or limited purely for economic
or efficiency reasons .... ").
252 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 540 (W.D. Va. 1997)
("Bending to the dictates of common sense, the Supreme Court [has] recognized that the be-
havior of minors may be constitutionally regulated more stringently than that of adults."); Nu-
nez v. City of San Diego, 963 F. Supp. 912, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir.
1997) ("The conclusion that minors possess a lesser right to free movement than adults corre-
sponds with society's recognition that minors are more vulnerable to society's dangers than
adults and that juveniles lack the ability 'to make critical decisions in an informed mature man-
ner."') (citation omitted); see also supra Part II (tracing judicial development of minors' rights).
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that there is no middle ground between strict scrutiny and rational
basis review. True, most due process cases fit neatly into a two-tiered
scheme of review. This method, however, is not set in stone. The
Court has already discarded it when analyzing cases under the Equal
Protection Clause.253 There is a similar need to discard the two-tiered
mode of analysis when dealing with the rights of minors. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, "[l]egal theories and their phrasing in other
cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of a State's duty towards children.
' '254
Analyzing all burdens on the rights of minors under a rational
basis standard of review does not respect Supreme Court precedent?
5
It also fails to give minors the respect they deserve as persons pos-
sessed of rights under the Constitution 25 6 by requiring only that legis-
lation respecting minors is not arbitrary, a requirement that all legis-
lation must meet anyhow. Therefore, something more than rational
basis review is required.
C. Intermediate Scrutiny: A Workable Compromise
We are left then with the task of defining the minor's relation-
ship vis-a-vis the state in the constitutional sense. Strict scrutiny is not
appropriate, 7 and neither is rational basis review.? What is needed
is an approach that recognizes the significance of a minor's dimin-
ished capacity and greater vulnerability without dehumanizing its
253 As Justice Marshall stated:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into
one of two neat categories that dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protec-
tion defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done
reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination alleg-
edly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
What Justice Marshall intuitively recognized in 1973 is now plainly evident in the
Court's jurisprudence. As Judge Michael recognized in Schleifer, "the presumption of equal
treatment under the Constitution is somewhat diluted by the sliding scale of scrutiny employed
by the Supreme Court, depending on the characteristics of the individual seeking constitutional
protection." 963 F. Supp. at 541. For example, while the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995), that all race-based classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny review, classifications that are based on gender are subject to an inter-
mediate level of review. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
24 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25 See supra Part IT (canvassing Supreme Court development of juvenile rights).
256 The Supreme Court has stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976) (citations omitted).
257 See supra Part Ml1.A.
258 See supra Part lII.B.
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subject-an approach that is both internally coherent, and not so for-
eign to the field of constitutional law that it is rendered impossible to
apply. As federal courts have increasingly come to recognize,259 the
proper standard of review in cases involving juvenile rights is inter-
mediate scrutiny.26
An intermediate standard of review finds support in two of the
court's opinions in cases dealing with abortion rights. First in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,261 and then again in Carey v. Population
Services International,262 the court flirted with an intermediate stan-
dard of review. In Danforth, the Court reviewed, inter alia, the con-
stitutionality of a portion of the abortion legislation passed by Mis-
souri that pertained to juveniles.263 The Court stated that the question
29 Several courts have applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny to juvenile rights. See,
e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer v.
City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 542 (W.D. Va. 1997); see also Peter L. Scherr, Note,
The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMp. L. 163, 191 (1992) (advocating a form of intermediate scrutiny to be applied to
evaluation ofjuvenile rights).
260 The test that I am proposing is confined to purported infringements upon the substan-
tive liberty interests of minors. Therefore, this test would not apply in determining the proce-
dural rights of minors in the juvenile court system. See generally Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (holding the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause applicable to minors in juvenile
court proceedings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply to minors in juvenile court proceedings); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that juveniles in a juvenile court proceeding are entitled
to the protection of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(1967) (holding the constitutional rights of notice to charges, counsel, confrontation, and cross-
examination, and privilege against self-incrimination applicable to juveniles in juvenile court
proceedings).
Likewise, the First Amendment may present a special case. At least in the context of
schools, there is greater reason to treat the First Amendment rights of juveniles as analogous to
those of adults. The First Amendment encompasses a societal right to information in the form of
ideas. As Justice Brandeis has stated:
[The founding fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and'spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the Ameri-
can government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
As has been recognized by the Court, "[tihe classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas"'
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). Since the interest recognized
here is societal and not individual, a full exploration of the issue of First Amendment juvenile
rights is beyond the scope of this Note.
261 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
262 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
263 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75. The applicable section of the Missouri statute required
that during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy the minor must obtain the written consent of one
parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if the woman was unmarried and under the age
of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to
preserve the life of the mother. See id. at 58. The court held that "the State does not have the
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was "whether there is any significant state interest... that is not pres-
ent in the case of an adult.' 264 A four-justice plurality applied the
same standard in Carey,.6 observing that "[t]his test is apparently less
rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test applied to restrictions
on the privacy rights of adults. 26 6 The plurality felt that this lesser
degree of scrutiny was appropriate, both because of the greater degree
of latitude that the states have when regulating the conduct of minors,
and because the law presumes that minors have a lesser capacity "for
making important decisions." 267 In each of these cases, the Court felt
the asserted interest was insignificant, and therefore did not comment
on how close the fit between the classification and the statute's pur-
pose would have to be to satisfy the test. However, courts should re-
quire that the classification be "substantially related" to the statute's
objectives.268
The requirement of a "significant," or important, governmental
objective assures that minors will not be the subject of dehumanizing
legislation.269 The primary concern in reviewing legislation affecting
juvenile rights, 270 which may be termed quasi-fundamental, should be
in assuring that the legislation was drafted out of genuine concern for,
and in furtherance of, a legislative purpose that is designed to protect
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitraty, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy." Id. at 74. The
court found that an asserted state interest in safeguarding the family unity and parental authority
was insufficient. See ii at 75.
264 Id. at 75.
265 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 691-99. The issue was the constitutionality of a nonprescription
contraception distribution ban pertaining to all minors under the age of 16. See id. at 691-92.
New York asserted an interest in discouraging sexual activity amongst the young. See id. at 694.
The Court, however, did not take this interest seriously. See id. at 694-96. The Court, for exam-
ple, found that "the State's interests in protection of the mental and physical health of the preg-
nant minor, and in protection of potential life are clearly more implicated by the abortion deci-
sion than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive," hL at 694, and that "there is
substantial reason for doubt whether limiting access to contraceptives will [as the State con-
tends], substantially discourage early sexual behavior." Id. at 695.
' Id. at 693 n.15.
267 Id.
2" The requirement of a "substantial relationship between the means chosen and the end
asserted is one of the hallmarks of an intermediate standard of review." See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-32 (2d ed. 1988).
269 As Professor Tribe explains, more generally, it has become "obvious ... that, as the
Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it
is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be
sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations." Id § 16-32.
270 I use the term juvenile rights here to refer to rights held by juveniles, which would be
fundamental if held by adults. For lack of a better term, it is perhaps appropriate to refer to these
rights of juveniles as quasi-fundamental rights. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's apparent recognition of public education as a
quasi-fundamental right).
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children. 271 The reason for this heightened standard of review, which
is less than strict scrutiny but more rigorous than rational basis, lies in
the recognition that children are persons under the constitution with
rights,272 but they are uniquely vulnerable and not always able to ex-
ercise their rights responsibly. 73
Therefore, courts should evaluate alleged infringements of juve-
nile rights under an intermediate standard of review. The recognition
of juvenile rights as quasi-fundamental suggests that they have value
and are worthy of respect. However, it also signifies the uniqueness of
the rights that juveniles possess and an understanding that their rights
are not as full in scope as the rights of their adult counterparts. Fur-
thermore, the requirement that a state demonstrate an important gov-
ernmental interest explicitly recognizes the greater authority of the
state to regulate juvenile rights.
The most important difference between this test and either
strict scrutiny or the proposed "compelling for children" test lies in
the fact that an intermediate standard allows for legislation as long
as it is "substantially related" to the legislative goals. Strict scru-
tiny is usually fatal in fact.274 While the inability of legislation to
survive such review may be attributed in large part to the "com-
pelling state interest" prong of the test, it is clear that the "least
drastic means" element is important as well. 2 75 Thus, the greater
latitude in means used that is afforded by this intermediate test is
crucial if the Court is to fulfill its promise that "the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope
of its authority over adults.2 76
271 As Professor Tribe explains, "[t]he 'establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to
achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."' TRIBE,
supra note 268, §16-32 (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-459 (1973) (White, J., con-
curring)).
m As the Danforth Court explained, "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976).
273 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (referring to the unique characteristics
of children which justify special treatment including, inter alia, "the peculiar vulnerability of
children" and a child's "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner").
274 See TRIBE, supra note 268, § 16-6 ("When expressed as a standard for judicial review,
strict scrutiny is ... 'strict' in theory and usually 'fatal' in fact.") (footnote omitted).
275 As one commentator explains, "[slome may argue that the 'less drastic means'
element is not required in most cases. However, a close examination of the Court's analy-
sis shows persistent consideration has been given to this element. The strict scrutiny stan-
dard has been almost impossible for lawmaking bodies to meet." Randall Fox, Equal
Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court, 14
U.S.F. L. REv. 525,526 n.4 (1980).
276 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
720 [Vol. 50:681
CURFEW LAWS AND THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
V. JUVENILE RIGHTS AND CURFEW ORDINANCES
"The spontaneity of children in responding to invitation to
play, without calculating the risk, is as well known as the
sequence of the seasons or the regularity with which night
follows day. It is not an imponderable, or a matter of
speculation. It is simply fact. ,277
This Part of the Note applies the tests derived in Parts III and IV
to juvenile curfew laws. These laws directly burden a minor's right to
travel on public fora, and are subject to a heightened standard of re-
view. Because the rights of minors are lesser in scope than those of
adults, however, an intermediate standard of review is applied.
Following hearings, the District of Columbia Council unani-
mously adopted the Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995.27 s The curfew bans
m2 Jennings v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 87 A.2d 206, 212 (Pa. 1952) (Musmanno, J., dis-
senting).
27' The text of the curfew law is set forth in an appendix to the District Court opinion. See
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, app. A at 681-82 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd on
reh'g en bane, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In pertinent part, the curfew ordinance reads:
§ 6-2182 Definitions
For the purposes of this act, the term:
(1) "Curfew hours" means from 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, or Thursday, until 6:00 a.m. on the following day, and from 12:01 a.m.
until 6:00 am. on any Saturday or Sunday. During the months of July and August,
the term "curfew hours" means from 12:01 a.m. until 6:00 a.m.
(2) "Emergency" means an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the result-
ing state that calls for immediate action. The term "emergency" includes, but is not
limited to, a fire, a natural disaster, an automobile accident, or any situation that re-
quires immediate action to prevent serious bodily injury or loss of life.
(3) 'Establishment" means any privately-owned place of business operated for profit
to which the public is invited, including, but not limited to, any place of amusement
or entertainment.
(4) "Guardian" means a person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person
of a minor or a public or private agency with whom a minor has been placed by the
court.
(5) "Minor" means any person under the age of 17 years, but does not include a ju-
dicially emancipated minor or a married minor.
(6) "Narcotic trafficking" means an act of engaging in any prohibited activity related
to narcotic drugs or controlled substances as defined in the District of Columbia
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981 ....
(7) "Operator" means any individual, firm, association, partnership, or corporation
that operates, manages, or conducts any establishment. The term "operator" includes
the members or partners of an association or partnership and the officers of a corpo-
ration.
(8) "Parent" means a natural parent, adoptive parent or step-parent, or any person
who has legal custody by court order or marriage, or any person not less than 21
years of age who is authorized by the natural parent, adoptive parent, step-parent, or
custodial parent of a child to be a caretaker for the child.
(9) "Public place" means any place to which the public, or a substantial group of the
public, has access, and includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the
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minors under the age of 17 from being in a public place without a
parent, or adult supervision, during certain hours. These hours include
11:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m. from Sunday night through Thursday morning,
and from midnight to 6:00 a.m. Saturday and Sunday. The curfew law
does not include minors who are "judicially emancipated" or mar-
ried.279
A. Is the Right to Travel Unduly Burdened?
In Hutchins v. District of Columbia,280 the District of Columbia
asserted that the ordinance furthered important interests in the reduc-
tion of juvenile crime and victimization. 28  The government could
argue that this regulation does not directly target a minor's interest in
traveling on public fora. Rather, the ordinance is attempting to reduce
common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport fa-
cilities, and shops.
(10) "Remain" means to linger or stay or fail to leave the premises when requested
to do so by a police officer or owner, operator, or other person in control of the
premises.
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of any bodily member or organ.
§ 6-2183 Curfew authority; defenses; enforcement and penalties.
(a)(1) A minor commits an offense if he or she remains in any public place or on the
premises of any establishment within the District of Columbia during curfew hours.
(b)(1) It is a defense to prosecution under this act that the minor was:
(A) Accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) On an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian, without any de-
tour or stop;
(C) In a motor vehicle, train, or bus involved in interstate travel;
(D) Engaged in an employment activity pursuant to [the District of Columbia child
employment act], or going to, or returning home from, an employment activity,
without detour or stop;
(E) Involved in an emergency;
(F) On the sidewalk that abuts the minor's residence or that abuts the residence of a
next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the Metropolitan Police De-
partment about the minor's presence;
(G) In attendance at an official school, religious, or other recreational activity spon-
sored by the District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another similar entity that
takes responsibility for a minor, or going to, or returning home from, without any
detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised
by adults and sponsored by the District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another
similar activity that takes responsibility for a minor, or
(H) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution,
including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly
D.C. CODE AN. §§ 6-2182, 2183 (Supp. 1999).
279 See supra note 278.
m 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
28' See id. at 541-42.
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juvenile crime and victimization. Thus, the ordinance impacts upon
the minor's right to travel on public fora only indirectly.
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much. Such
an argument would almost always convert direct regulations into in-
cidental burdens because "what renders the exercise of a right offen-
sive to the majority has little to do with what renders the right valu-
able to the rightholder. '282 In other words, "it is usually possible to
characterize the harm that a right's exercise causes in a way that does
not target the right's value from the perspective of the rightholder."
283
Here, the burden is not incidental in the usual sense because it
applies only to conduct that is protected. The ordinance, while being
concerned with juvenile crime and victimization, does not punish or
seek to regulate any conduct associated with these two goals other
than a minor's right to travel. The burden is thus direct in the sense
that the means the legislature used to further its goals were solely
concerned with restricting a minor's right to travel. Hence, the regu-
lation is targeted to prevent a minor's exercise of the right to travel.
As Judge Rogers observed, "[w]hatever else the curfew might be, it is
not an incidental burden. The curfew... does not constrain specific
types of movement, but with few exceptions bars all movement in
public; it is not confined to a brief period, but extends for roughly
25% of the day."284 Therefore, the curfew law is subjected to height-
ened scrutiny because it imposes a "substantial obstacle" on a minor's
right to travel.
B. Curfew Laws and Intermediate Scrutiny
In order to pass the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to
an alleged infringement of a minor's quasi-fundamental right, the
District of Columbia curfew law must be substantially related to sig-
nificant state interests. 285
1. Significant State Interests
The District of Columbia's interest in enacting its curfew law
was "to protect the welfare of minors by reducing the likelihood that
minors will perpetrate or become victims of crime and by promoting
2 Dorf, supra note 205, at 1222.
28' Id. at 1223.
24 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 562 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
m See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (framing the intermediate scrutiny standard
as whether the legislative classification is "substantially related to permissible state interests");
see also supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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parental responsibility.' ' 86 There should be no doubt that these inter-
ests are substantial.
The Court has long recognized that a state's interest in the well-
being of its youth is compelling. In New York v. Ferber,287 the Court
stated that "a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psy-
chological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling."' 288 In Ginsburg v.
New York,289 the Court- recognized that society has an interest in as-
suring that children are "'safeguarded from abuses' which might pre-
vent their 'growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens.' '290 This interest exists "even when the laws have operated
in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights. 29'
Several lower courts have questioned whether a state or local
government has an interest in enacting a curfew law that is "compel-
ling for children. '292 The argument is that the state does not have an
interest that is compelling for children because a minor is not "pecu-
liarly vulnerable" to night-time crime, and "the decision to go outside
during certain hours does not involve any critical decisions by mi-
nors. ' 93 As set forth above,294 this approach is conceptually mis-
guided because it equates a minor's capacity with the state's interest
instead of with the scope of the minor's right. However, the argument
also rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of precedent.
The decisions that hold that the state or local government does
not have an interest in enacting a curfew law that is "compelling for
children" rely on the three factors set forth in Bellotti v. Baird.295
The Bellotti plurality stated that "the Court has held that the
States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for them-
selves in the making of important, affirmative choices with poten-
tially serious consequences. 296 Interpreting this portion of Bellotti to
286 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541-42 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596,607 (1982)).
287 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
2"8 Id. at 756-57.
2'9 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
290 Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,'321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
291 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
292 See, e.g., Waters v. Berry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that the
danger of nighttime violence is not peculiar to children and curfews may infringe on parental
choice); Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 608-09 (Md. App. 1992). But see Nunez v. City of
San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing "that minors are more susceptible to
the dangers of the night and are generally less equipped to deal with danger that does arise").
293 Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 609 (Md. App. 1992).
294 See supra Part IV (advocating the intermediate scrutiny standard for review of juvenile
rights).
295 443 U.S. 622 (1979). For a discussion of Bellotti, see supra notes 224-26 and accompa-
nying text.
296 Id. at 635.
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require that the decision be a "critical" one29 7 is simply wrong. How
important must these choices be? In the next sentence, the Bellotti
plurality explains that "minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to . . . avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them."2
98
In explaining what "choices that could be detrimental" means,
the Bellotti plurality relied exclusively on the case of Ginsberg v. New
York.2 99 Ginsberg involved a minor's asserted right to choose whether
to buy "so-called 'girlie' magazines." 3°° The Court did not require
proof that the purchase of these magazines could be detrimental.
Rather, it was enough for the Court that "the growing consensus of
commentators is that 'while these studies all agree that a causal link
has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link
has not been disproved either.' 30 1 Hence, choices that are "impor-
tant," or "could be detrimental," are choices that a rational person
believes could harm a child, if there is no solid proof to the contrary.
With respect to curfew laws, the Ninth Circuit's observation is on
point: "[I]t [is] unexceptional for the City to conclude that minors are
more susceptible to the dangers of the night and are generally less
equipped to deal with danger that does arise., 302
In sum, it is clear that a government has a significant interest in
safeguarding the welfare of minors. This interest is present where the
government enacts a curfew law, and nothing in Bellotti should be
construed to the contrary. These curfew laws are constitutional when
challenged on right to travel grounds if they are "substantially re-
lated" to this interest. 30
3
2. Curfew Laws and the "Substantial Relation" Requirement
The substantial relation requirement does not require mathemati-
cal precision. "In the end, the precise accuracy of [the State's] calcu-
lations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and [courts]
have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency
and substantiality. ' '3°4 The Court has emphasized that, "[it is unreal-
istic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be
well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique." 30 5
297 Brown, 611 A.2d at 609.
29' Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (footnote omitted).
29 See id. at 636 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
30' Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631.
301 Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
302 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997).
-10- See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
3 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,274 (1978).305 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,204 (1976).
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What is required is a fit between the governmental interests and the
means chosen that is not unduly tenuous.306 However, such a relation-
ship does have-to be empirical. °7
The District of Columbia was confronted with evidence of an
ever-increasing juvenile crime rate. 308 The evidence before' the Dis-
trict Court included statistics, which stated that in 1992 the D.C.
crime arrest rate for youths aged ten to seventeen was the highest in
the nation. 309 D.C. also "had the highest violent death rate [in the na-
tion] for teens ages 15 to 19 .. ,,."0 The D.C. Council also had be-
fore it statistics that showed a high number of incidents of violent
crime in areas covered by the curfew.3 1'
The D.C. Council reviewed evidence relating to the efficacy of
juvenile curfew laws in other jurisdictions, which showed that after a
juvenile curfew was enacted the number of juvenile arrests for violent
offenses decreased.312 A couple of jurisdictions had also experienced
a reduction in juvenile victimization. 313 The Council heard evidence
that "more than 50% of juvenile arrests took place during curfew
hours. 314 The D.C. Council also utilized a statistical projection from
the police chief on the anticipated effect of a curfew statute.315
306 See Lali, 439 U.S. at 273 (stating that a court's constitutional inquiry into a state law
"does not focus on the abstract "fairness" of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to
the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated
by the Fourteenth Amendment"). As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
We will not... insist upon detailed studies of the precise severity, nature, and char-
acteristics of the juvenile crime problem in analyzing whether the [curfew law]
meets constitutional muster .... Federal courts have always been reluctant to ques-
tion the potential effectiveness of legislative remedies designed to address societal
problems.
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1993).
307 See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 274.
308 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
3o9 See id. This rate was more than three times the national average. See id.
310 Id.
311 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd on
reh'g en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The court continued:
Further, elected representatives of Advisory Neighborhood Commissions ("ANCs")
and other District residents testified before the D.C. Council about violence plaguing
the streets, gunfire from early evening through early morning, children counting the
new bullet holes every morning in the doors to their kindergartens, the worsening of
teen violence, the gang victimization of youths, and murder becoming sport.
Id. at 810-11.
312 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 675 n.13, rev'd on reh'g en
banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that statistics from Dallas showed that the city
recorded a 21.7% decrease in juvenile arrests for violent crimes); Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 812
(noting similar studies in New Orleans and San Antonio).
313 See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 675 n.13 (noting that statistics from San Antonio showed
a 60% decrease in juvenile victimization during curfew hours).
314 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544.
315 See Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 812. The Police Chief informed the D.C. Council, after the
curfew law had been in effect for three months, "that '[tihe juvenile curfew has made a signifi-
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The "substantial relation" requirement is satisfied by such a
showing. Experiences of other cities with curfew laws are an impor-
tant source of information that should not be disregarded "so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be
relevant to the problem that the city addresses. ' 316 As Judge Silber-
man, writing for the plurality in Hutchins, remarked, "it would be
folly for any city not to look at experiences of other cities."
317
The fact that some of the statistics used by the Council included
17-year-olds, who were not subject to the curfew, does not make the
"fit" insubstantial. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he 'pre-
cise accuracy of [the State's] calculations is not a matter of special-
ized judicial competence.' ' 318 Additionally, "few statutory classifica-
tions -are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce
inequitable results." 319 Crime deterrence is not the sole concern of
those who pass a curfew law. The legislature also must consider the
average maturity of the age group whose rights it inhibits.
Therefore, while it may well be that juveniles who are age sev-
enteen commit a significant portion of juvenile crimes, the fact that
this group of juveniles is excluded from the ordinance does not make
the means insubstantially related to the ends of the curfew law. The
presumably higher degree of maturity possessed by seventeen year-
olds320 justifies their exclusion from the curfew law.321 The precise
accuracy of this legislative determination is not a matter of "special-
ized judicial competence."
The fact that the Council was unable to discern the precise num-
ber of juvenile crimes that took place during curfew hours is also not
determinative. The Council was presented with evidence that "more
than 50% of juvenile arrests took place during curfew hours."322 Un-
der similar circumstances, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[a]lthough the
city was unable to provide precise data concerning the number of ju-
veniles who commit crimes during the curfew hours, or the number of
cant impact on the District's youth arrest rate,' noting a decrease of 39% in the arrest rate for
more serious offenses and a 34% decrease over all." Id. at 814 n.28.
316 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986).
317 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544.
"' Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978) (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515
(1976).
319 Id. at 273.
20 17 year-olds, after all, are only one year removed from exercising the right to vote. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVL
.21 The discussion in Part IV, supra, demonstrates that what justifies the differential treat-
ment of minors is their comparative lack of capacity. When precisely this lack of capacity ends,
or ceases to become determinative where it is still relevant, is a question without a clear answer.
It is, however, a determination that should be made by the parents of the community through
their council members, rather than by unelected federal judges.
322 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531,544 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en bane).
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juvenile victims of crimes committed during the curfew, the city
nonetheless provided sufficient data to demonstrate that the classifi-
cation created by the ordinance 'fits.' ' 323 Because there is a sufficient
fit between the means used by the District of Columbia and the goal
of protecting juveniles from crime and victimization, the curfew is
constitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
More than eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis looked upon our
system of government and remarked that "one of the happy incidents
of the federal system [is] that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 324 The na-
tion has been experimenting with the efficacy of curfew laws for the
past ten years. Courts should not step in and stop this experiment.
While a right to travel on public fora exists, the rights of minors have
always been subject to certain burdens that a state could not place on
the rights of adults. Unless cities panic and pass curfew laws without
justification, these laws should survive constitutional scrutiny because
they are substantially related to the significant government interest of
protecting juveniles from crime.
BENJAMIN C. SASSIt
32 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,493-94 (5th Cir. 1993).
324 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
t With thanks to Professor Jonathan Entin for suggesting the topic, to Professor Ken
Margolis for reviewing earlier drafts of this Note, and Cynthia Sass6 for her helpful editorial
suggestions.
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